An Analysis of Acceptance Policies For Blockchain Transactions

The standard acceptance policy for a cryptocurrency transaction at most exchanges is to wait until the transaction is placed in the blockchain and followed by a certain number of blocks. However, as noted by Sompolinsky and Zohar [16], the amount of time for blocks to arrive should also be taken into account as it affects the probability of double spending. Specifically, they propose a dynamic policy for transaction acceptance that depends on both the number of confirmations and the amount of time since transaction broadcast. In this work we study the implications of using such a policy compared with the standard option that ignores block timing information. Using an exact expression for the probability of double spend, via numerical results, we analyze time to transaction acceptance (performance) as well as the time and cost to perform a double spend attack (security). We show that while expected time required for transaction acceptance is improved using a dynamic policy, the time and cost to perform a double spend attack for a particular transaction is reduced.

[1]  R. Gallager Stochastic Processes , 2014 .

[2]  Aviv Zohar,et al.  Bitcoin's Security Model Revisited , 2016, ArXiv.

[3]  Hubert Ritzdorf,et al.  On the Security and Performance of Proof of Work Blockchains , 2016, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch..

[4]  S. Matthew Weinberg,et al.  On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward , 2016, CCS.

[5]  Jeremy Clark,et al.  SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies , 2015, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.

[6]  Moti Yung,et al.  Secure Wallet-Assisted Offline Bitcoin Payments with Double-Spender Revocation , 2017, AsiaCCS.

[7]  Kartik Nayak,et al.  Stubborn Mining: Generalizing Selfish Mining and Combining with an Eclipse Attack , 2016, 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P).

[8]  Camilo Rocha,et al.  Double-spend Attack Models with Time Advantange for Bitcoin , 2016, CLEI Selected Papers.

[9]  Emin Gün Sirer,et al.  Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable , 2013, Financial Cryptography.

[10]  Aviv Zohar,et al.  Secure High-Rate Transaction Processing in Bitcoin , 2015, Financial Cryptography.

[11]  Aviv Zohar,et al.  Optimal Selfish Mining Strategies in Bitcoin , 2015, Financial Cryptography.

[12]  Satoshi Nakamoto Bitcoin : A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System , 2009 .

[13]  Meni Rosenfeld,et al.  Analysis of Hashrate-Based Double Spending , 2014, ArXiv.

[14]  Ethan Heilman,et al.  Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin's Peer-to-Peer Network , 2015, USENIX Security Symposium.