International Journal of Emerging Electric Power Systems Efficient Market Design and Public Goods , Part II : Theoretical Results
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Daniel Tylavsky | James S. Thorp | Robert J. Thomas | Richard E. Schuler | William D. Schulze | David Toomey | J. Thorp | D. Tylavsky | W. Schulze | R. Schuler | D. Toomey | R. Thomas | J. Daniel | Tylavsky
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