论文信息 - A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest

A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest

This paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contest in which there may be several winners. We first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest. In contrast to the previous work, we show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large.

Derek J. Clark | Christian Riis | Christian Riis

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