Externalities in Socially-Based Resource Sharing Network

This paper investigates the impact of link formation between a pair of agents on resource availability of other agents in a social cloud network, which is a special case of socially-based resource sharing systems. Specifically, we study the correlation between externalities, network size, and network density. We first conjecture and experimentally support that if an agent experiences positive externalities, then its closeness (harmonic centrality measure) should increase. Next, we show the following for ring networks: in less populated networks no agent experiences positive externalities; in more populated networks a set of agents experience positive externalities, and larger the distance between agents forming a link, more the number of beneficiaries; and the number of beneficiaries is always less than the number of non-beneficiaries. Finally, we show that network density is inversely proportional to positive externalities, and further, it plays a crucial role in determining the kind of externalities.

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