Understanding Cooperative Behavior Based on the Coevolution of Game Strategy and Link Weight

In reality, the dependency relationship among individuals is heterogeneous and time-varying. Based on this fact, we present a new mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight when analyzing the evolution of cooperation. In detail, we model the population on a regular network, on which the relationship between players is depicted by a weighted link, and prisoner’s dilemma has been applied to describe the interaction of players. Further, the impact of this mechanism on the cooperative behavior has been outlined. By conducting large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we can easily draw a conclusion that this mechanism can promote cooperation efficiently. Compared with the traditional case, when the temptation of defection b is large, the fraction of cooperation is still able to keep in a high level. With a comprehensive examination of the distribution of stable link weight, it is evident that the coevolution mechanism would deviate the initial distribution. This mechanism induces the heterogeneity of players, which enhances the fraction of cooperation. Numerical simulations also indicate that an intermediate value of Δ/δ warrants an optimal resolution of prisoner’s dilemma. The mechanism of coevolution of game strategy and link weight has a practical significance and will provide new insight for the further research.

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