Impresa non profit: efficienza, ideologia e codice etico

Analisi dei fattori determinanti per l'efficienza dell'organizzazione non profit nella produzione di beni sociali o di welfare. L'autore sostiene la tesi secondo la quale il fattore base dell'efficienza di questo tipo di organizzazioni e l'attitudine ad avvalersi di principi ideologici e codici etici di autoregolamentazione. In particolare l'autore analizza l'interdipendenza tra il ruolo cognitivo del codice etico che sostiene la relazione fiduciaria dell'organizzazione con i suoi agenti esterni (donatori e beneficiari) e il ruolo motivazionale dell'deologia che genera preferenze conformiste tra gli agenti interni all'organizzazione stessa.

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