Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Kevin Leyton-Brown,et al. Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions , 2009, EC '09.
[2] John C. Harsanyi,et al. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III: Part I. The Basic Model& , 2004, Manag. Sci..
[3] William Vickrey,et al. Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .
[4] Ashish Goel,et al. Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords , 2006, EC '06.
[5] Sébastien Lahaie,et al. An analysis of alternative slot auction designs for sponsored search , 2006, EC '06.
[6] SaberiAmin,et al. AdWords and generalized online matching , 2007 .
[7] E. H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .
[8] Kane S. Sweeney,et al. Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction , 2009, EC '09.
[9] Theodore Groves,et al. Incentives in Teams , 1973 .
[10] J. Harsanyi. Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game , 1968 .
[11] R. Vohra,et al. Algorithmic Game Theory: Sponsored Search Auctions , 2007 .
[12] Aranyak Mehta,et al. AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching , 2005, FOCS.
[13] RoughgardenTim. Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy , 2012 .
[14] Allan Borodin,et al. Price of anarchy for greedy auctions , 2009, SODA '10.