A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: an Analysis of a Social Interaction System

since the days of journeyman Brooklyn Dodger outfielder Gene Hermanski, who reportedly stormed into Branch Rickey's office after a particularly good season fully expecting a raise. When, upon emerging, he was asked if he got the deserved salary increase, he replied, "No, but at least I didn't take a pay cut!" Miller continually stresses the crucial importance of unionization to the players in transforming their once monopsonistic labor market into one in which competition became much more prevalent. He succeeds ably in demonstrating this point. The reader will enjoy his discussions of maligned Angel Alex Johnson, the Curt Flood case, baseball's various strikes and lockouts, and above all, the fascinating characters Miller had to deal with over the years. Consider, for example, Miller's depiction of former baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn. One sentence epitomizes Miller's characterization of Kuhn: "Kuhn must be singled out as the most important contributor to the successes of the Players Association" (p. 91). As an aside and for an eye-opening exercise, read Bowie Kuhn's own account of these same labor relations issues in his book Hardball: The Education of a Baseball Commissioner (Times Books, 1987). These two accounts of many of the same situations are so vastly different as to make one wonder whether these two men ever agreed on anything! I found two distracting elements in this otherwise engrossing book. First, Miller is constantly patting himself on the back for a job well done and criticizing others for not living up to his own standards of excellence. For example, Miller has this to say about his replacement as head of the players' union, Ken Moffett: "Ken Moffett started on the job on January 2, 1983. Let me correct that: He started on the payroll on that day. He never really started on the job" (p. 324). And then there is Miller's statement about the 1985 compromise the players made on salary arbitration and pension contributions by the owners. Don Fehr had by this time taken over as head of the union. Miller comments: "By 1985 the players had lost touch with their own history. This was the union's fault-Don Fehr's fault" (p. 338). Second, Miller has an extremely negative view of player agents, and his repeated criticism of players for not understanding their situations and for not realizing how much he and the union had done for them becomes tiresome. That Miller and the union helped these players tremendously is so obvious that the point does not need to be reiterated. Despite the enormous gains he had won for players, Miller apparently felt unappreciated, and, I believe, he considered himself underpaid for all his efforts. In the end, I wound up feeling a bit sorry for Marvin Miller. Having noted these irritating flaws, I nevertheless strongly urge anyone interested in baseball's labor relations to read and reread Miller's book. It has a great message for all of us who practice, study, and teach industrial relations. That message is a simple one. Hard work can pay off, and the process of collective bargaining can effectively restore the balance of bargaining power between labor and management.