Uncertainty aversion in nonprobabilistic decision models

This paper proposes a definition of uncertainty aversion for nonprobabilistic decision models and characterizes the decision rules that are uncertainty averses in that sense. Dual results are obtained for uncertainty appeal and it is shown that imposing an uncertainty neutrality condition leads to an impossibility result.

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