论文信息 - Philosophical and Scientific Presuppositions of Logical AI

Philosophical and Scientific Presuppositions of Logical AI

Philosophers have done interesting work that may be useful for AI. However, some philosophical points of view make assumptions that have the effect of excluding the possibility of AI. Likewise work on Al is not neutral with regard to philosophical issues. This chapter presents what we consider the presuppositions of logical AI and also some scientific presuppositions, i.e. some results of science that are relevant. We emphasize the relation to AI rather than philosophy itself2.

John McCarthy | J. McCarthy

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