Why major accidents are still occurring

Major accidents happen in the process industries with relatively low frequencies but extremely severe consequences. Harm to workers and the public, loss of company property and other assets, business interruption, and environmental degradation are all possible outcomes of such events. This paper explores the occurrence of major process accidents and offers suggestions for their prevention according to seven core concepts drawn from an analysis of the 1984 Bhopal tragedy: (i) the creation of paradigm-enhancing organizations, (ii) inherently safer design, (iii) awareness of the total cost of major accidents, (iv) consideration of the broader societal and cultural aspects of major accidents, (v) process safety culture, (vi) process safety competency, and (vii) dynamic operational risk management.

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