论文信息 - Bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double-sided auctions

Bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double-sided auctions

In this paper, the problem of developing bidding strategies in oligopolistic dynamic electricity double-sided auctions is studied. We model electricity double-sided auctions as dynamic systems and use Nash-Cournot strategies for the market participants (generating firms and load serving entities). Through simulation studies, we compare the efficiency and competitiveness of electricity double-sided auctions to those of electricity supplier-only auctions (using the developed bidding strategies).

[1] Marwan A. Simaan,et al. Stochastic Discrete-Time Nash Games with Constrained State Estimators , 2002 .

[2] F. Alvarado. The stability of power system markets , 1999 .

[3] Dimitri P. Bertsekas,et al. Dynamic Programming: Deterministic and Stochastic Models , 1987 .

[4] Richard E. Schuler. Analytic and experimentally derived estimates of market power in deregulated electricity systems: policy implications for the management and institutional evolution of the industry , 2001, Decis. Support Syst..

[5] Jeroen M. Swinkels,et al. EFFICIENCY OF LARGE DOUBLE AUCTIONS , 2003 .

[6] Ray Zimmerman,et al. Testing the effects of price responsive demand on uniform price and soft-cap electricity auctions , 2002, Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences.

[7] Leigh Tesfatsion,et al. Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing , 2001, IEEE Trans. Evol. Comput..

[8] John C. Bernard,et al. EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPETITIVE MARKETS FOR ELECTRIC POWER USING POWERWEB , 2000 .

[9] Michele Trovato,et al. Dynamics of non-collusive oligopolistic electricity markets , 2000, 2000 IEEE Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting. Conference Proceedings (Cat. No.00CH37077).