A generic model for symbolic analyzing security protocols

Formal methods have proved useful in the analysis of security protocols. In this paper, we propose a generic model for symbolic analyzing security protocols (GSPM for short) that supports message passing semantics and constructs for modelling the behavior of protocol participants. GSPM is simple, but it is expressive enough to express security protocols and properties in a precise and faithful manner. In order to address that the execution of a protocol generates infinitely many paths, we use symbolic method. Based on GSPM, it is shown how security properties such as confidentiality, authentication, non-repudiation, fairness and anonymity can be described.

[1]  Gavin Lowe,et al.  Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR , 1996, Softw. Concepts Tools.

[2]  Luca Cardelli,et al.  Mobile Ambients , 1998, FoSSaCS.

[3]  Dieter Gollmann,et al.  Towards Verification of Non-repudiation Protocols , 1998 .

[4]  Martín Abadi,et al.  A Calculus for Cryptographic Protocols: The spi Calculus , 1999, Inf. Comput..

[5]  Glynn Winskel,et al.  Events in security protocols , 2001, CCS '01.

[6]  Steve A. Schneider Security properties and CSP , 1996, Proceedings 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.

[7]  Robin Milner,et al.  A Calculus of Mobile Processes, II , 1992, Inf. Comput..

[8]  Martín Abadi,et al.  A calculus for cryptographic protocols: the spi calculus , 1997, CCS '97.

[9]  Michele Boreale,et al.  Symbolic Trace Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols , 2001, ICALP.

[10]  Maria Grazia Buscemi,et al.  Symbolic Analysis of Crypto-Protocols Based on Modular Exponentiation , 2003, MFCS.

[11]  Danny Dolev,et al.  On the security of public key protocols , 1981, 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1981).

[12]  Lawrence C. Paulson,et al.  The Inductive Approach to Verifying Cryptographic Protocols , 2021, J. Comput. Secur..

[13]  C. A. R. Hoare,et al.  Communicating sequential processes , 1978, CACM.