The Many Facets of the Theory of Rationality

Modern theory of rationality has become large and rich. The search for the most general principles is driven forward as much as the countless specializations in countless branches. Often, the questions lie far apart. The methods to answer them are often disparate and none of the questions is exhausted. The theory of rationality has truly grown into a science of its own. Many details have become so special that the philosophical relevance is lost. It is, however, evident that the general topic is genuinely philosophical. This essay is concerned with giving a brief overview over the theory of rationality. Section 2 explains the common and an improved version of the fundamental scheme of all rationality assessments. With its help, we can give a schematic order of the main questions concerning the theory of rationality, and we shall find that some questions are addressed by a wealth of literature, whereas other questions find astonishingly little response. Section 3 discusses the fundamental issue that the theory of rationality seems to be both a normative and an empirical theory. Section 4, finally, shows how the unity of the theory of rationality can nevertheless be maintained. The purpose of this essay is to serve as a kind of guide for the reader. 1

[1]  Wolfgang Spohn,et al.  A Brief Comparison Of Pollock's Defeasible Reasoning And Ranking Functions , 2002, Synthese.

[2]  Matthias Hild,et al.  The Coherence Argument Against Conditionalization , 1998, Synthese.

[3]  E. Feteris.  Millgram, Elijah (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning (2001) , 2003 .

[4]  André Fuhrmann,et al.  Change, Choice and Inference , 2003 .

[5]  Wolfgang Spohn,et al.  Dependency Equilibria and the Casual Structure of Decision and Game Situations , 2003 .

[6]  J. Nida-Rümelin.  Strukturelle Rationalität : ein philosophischer Essay über praktische Vernunft , 2001 .

[7]  Werner G³th.  How Ultimatum Offers Emerge: A Study in Bounded Rationality , 2001 .

[8]  M. Nussbaum.  Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions , 2001 .

[9]  Wolfgang Spohn.  Lewis' Principal Principle ist ein Spezialfall von van Fraassens Reflexion Principle * , 2000 .

[10]  J. Habermas.  Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung : philosophische Aufsätze , 1999 .

[11]  Robert Stalnaker.  Context And Content , 1999 .

[12]  Wolfgang Spohn,et al.  Two Coherence Principles , 1999 .

[13]  M. Hild.  Auto-Epistemology and Updating , 1998 .

[14]  Wolfgang Spohn,et al.  II—How to Understand the Foundations of Empirical Belief in a Coherentist Way , 1998 .

[15]  A. Rubinstein.  Modeling Bounded Rationality , 1998 .

[16]  Thomas Bartelborth.  Begründungsstrategien: Ein Weg durch die analytische Erkenntnistheorie , 1996 .

[17]  J. Kagel,et al.  Handbook of Experimental Economics , 1997 .

[18]  Bas C. van Fraassen,et al.  Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens , 1995 .

[19]  L. G. Neuberg,et al.  Bayes or Bust?-A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. , 1994 .

[20]  H. Kyburg.  The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing , 1994 .

[21]  Julian Nida-Rümelin,et al.  Logik kollektiver Entscheidungen , 1994 .

[22]  Dov M. Gabbay,et al.  Handbook of logic in artificial intelligence and logic programming (vol. 1) , 1993 .

[23]  P. Maher.  Betting on Theories , 1993 .

[24]  Wolfgang Spohn.  Wie kann die Theorie der Rationalität normativ und empirisch zugleich sein , 1993 .

[25]  D. Hunter.  Maximum Entropy Updating and Conditionalization , 1991 .

[26]  E. McClennen.  Rationality and dynamic choice , 1990 .

[27]  Brian Skyrms,et al.  The Dynamics Of Rational Deliberation , 1990 .

[28]  J. P. Van Bendegem.  Choices. An introduction to decision theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Michael D. Resnik , 1988, Philosophica.

[29]  Peter Gärdenfors,et al.  Knowledge in Flux , 1988 .

[30]  P G rdenfors,et al.  Knowledge in flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states , 1988 .

[31]  Wolfgang Spohn,et al.  Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States , 1988 .

[32]  M. Resnik.  Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory , 1990 .

[33]  Peter C. Ordeshook,et al.  Game Theory And Political Theory , 1987 .

[34]  J. Friedman.  Game theory with applications to economics , 1986 .

[35]  J. Pollock.  Contemporary theories of knowledge , 1986 .

[36]  Van Fraassen,et al.  Belief and the Will , 1984 .

[37]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma , 1982 .

[38]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[39]  A. White.  Essays on Actions and Events. , 1981 .

[40]  J. Habermas.  Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns , 1981 .

[41]  G. Shafer,et al.  Expected Utility Hypotheses and the Allais Paradox. , 1982 .

[42]  Ronald de Sousa,et al.  The rationality of emotions , 1979 .

[43]  Wolfgang Spohn,et al.  Grundlagen der Entscheidungstheorie , 1978 .

[44]  Austin J. Bonis.  Gambling With Truth , 1976 .

[45]  K. Bellmann,et al.  Stegmüller, W.: Personelle und Statistische Wahrscheinlichkeit. 1. Halbband: Personelle Wahrscheinlichkeit und Rationale Entscheidung (Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie, Band 4). Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York 1973. XXIV, 560 S., 12 Abb., DM 89 , 1975 .

[46]  A. Tversky,et al.  Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , 1974, Science.

[47]  W. Stegmüller.  Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und analytischen Philosophie , 1974 .

[48]  R. Kirk.  CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY , 1970 .

[49]  Richard C. Jeffrey,et al.  Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science , 1968 .

[50]  R. Jeffrey.  The Logic of Decision , 1968 .

[51]  P. Baume.  Ends and Means: , 1938, Nature.

[52]  Aldous Huxley,et al.  Ends and Means , 1937 .