Formation of overlapping coalitions for precedence-ordered task-execution among autonomous agents *

(;ell-satisfaction in multi-agent environments via coalition formation may be beneficial in cases where agents cannot perform goals by themselves or they do so inefficiently. Agent coalition forn|alkm typically requires that each agent must be a member of only Olle coalition. This may lead to wasted resources alld capabilities. Therefore, we. present algorithms that lead agents to the formation of overlapping t:oMition~, where each coalition is assigned a goal. The algorithms we present arc. appropriate for agents working as a Distributed l)rolflem Solving system in non-superadditive environments. Th(.y arc: any-time distributed Mgorithms with a low computational complexity and low ratio-bound.

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