Experimental Testing of Intrinsic Preferences for NonInstrumental Information

The classical model of decision making under uncertainty assumes that decision makers care only about final outcomes. The decision mak­ ers’ beliefs enter the model only as a means of weighting the possible material outcomes, yet they do not generate an intrinsic value by themselves. Put differently, they are not part of the domain over which preferences are defined. Consequently, psychological effects of beliefs such as anxiety, suspense, and curiosity are left out of the classical model. A growing trend in the literature argues that the inclusion of beliefs in the domain of preferences accommodates an even richer set of behaviors and allows us to address questions that are left unanswered by the classical model. One particular question that has received much attention is: why do people sometimes avoid information, which is instrumental in mak­ ing their decisions? For example, why do people who may be at risk of exposure to HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, avoid being tested when such tests are available at no cost (Andrew Caplin and Eliaz 2003)? Such information avoidance is explained by positing that people derive an intrinsic disutility from anticipating a bad out­ come. Hence, when deciding whether to obtain information, individuals not only consider the “material benefit” they could gain from updating their beliefs, but they also consider the implied “lottery” on their posterior beliefs. This explanation implies the converse, that decision makers may also seek noninstrumen­ tal information, i.e., information that will not change their ultimate decision but will allow