Stable flows with restricted edges

The stable marriage problem with its extensions is a widely studied subject. In this paper, we combine two topics related to it, setting up new and generalizing known results in both. The stable flow problem extends the well-known stable matching problem to network flows. Restricted edges have some special properties: forced edges must be in the stable solution, while forbidden edges may not be in it. Free edges are not able to block matchings. Here we describe a polynomial algorithm that finds a stable flow with forced and forbidden edges or proves its nonexistence. In contrast to this, we also show that determining whether a stable flow with free edges exists, is NP-complete.

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