Theories, theoretical models, truth

Both the presuppositions underlying a scientific theory and the theoretical claims of which the theory consists play a twofold role at the same time. They are both settle, and they are meant to confine the way in which the terms specific to the theory may be interpreted. These two functions (descriptive and semantic) cannot be separated in any sharp way. The process of the formation of scientific theories consists of the formation of both the conceptual apparatus (the language of the theory) and the set of claims intended to account for the regularities characteristic of the examined phenomena. One of the main theses of this paper is that the hypotheses one can formulate within a given theory may not have a definite truth value, if the conceptual apparatus of the theory in question is not “veristic”, i.e. the correspondence between the concepts and the elements of structure of the phenomena to which the theory refers is not defined in a complete and unique manner. The concept of truth and the relevance of this concept for metatheoretical investigations is the central issue of the paper, both its present part and the one to appear in the next issue. the considerations the reader is going to find in this part are carried out in a rather loose way. A more formal exposition of some of the topics undertaken here is to be found in the forthcoming part.