Reference, inference and the semantics of pejoratives

1. Introduction. Two opposing tendencies in the philosophy of language go by the names of 'referentialism' and 'inferentialism' respectively. In the crudest version of the contrast, the referentialist account of meaning gives centre stage to the referential semantics for a language, which is then used to explain the inference rules for the language, perhaps as those which preserve truth on that semantics (since a referential semantics for a language determines the truth-conditions of its sentences). By contrast, the inferentialist account of meaning gives centre stage to the inference rules for the language, which are then used to explain its referential semantics, perhaps as the semantics on which the rules preserve truth. On pain of circularity, we cannot combine both directions of explanation. Of course, this simple opposition may not survive more refined definitions of 'referentialism' and 'inferentialism'. Not all of those willing to apply one or other term to their views would accept the crude characterizations just given. Nevertheless, the two styles of theorizing often function as rivals in practice. There is a corresponding contrast in the philosophy of thought, concerning the reference of concepts, rather than of 1 expressions of a public language, and inferential connections between thoughts, rather than between sentences. 2 3 If inferentialists appealed only to inference rules, they could not hope to explain how many words refer to extra-linguistic objects, or how language is used in interaction with the extra-linguistic environment. We may therefore assume that, in addition to intra-linguistic rules such as the introduction and elimination rules for the logical constants in a Gentzen-style system of natural deduction, inferentialists may also advert to 'language-entry' rules that connect perceptual states to moves in the language game, and 'language-exit' rules that connect moves in the language game to non-linguistic actions. Inferential roles are thereby generalized as conceptual roles. 1 The details do not matter here, for the overall picture is the same. The rules by which speakers use the language have explanatory primacy. The referential semantics is a kind of epiphenomenon. At least on the simplest versions of inferentialism, understanding a word is equated with using it according to the appropriate rules, not with having propositional knowledge of its referential meaning: practice is prior to theory. At first sight, inferentialism may appear to be a conservative or quietist view: since whatever rules the speech community uses thereby determine a semantics on which those very rules come …