Resisting the Revival of Relativism

This paper examines a new radical relativism, epitomised in David Bloor's 'strong programme', which asserts the social character and social causation of all knowledge. It thus stakes an explanatory claim for the sociology of knowledge to the entire cultural domain. Traditionally resistance to relativism rests on counter-asserting (a) the necessary universality of logical principles before any mode of life can be intelligible, (b) the unicity of 'human nature' as axiomatic to cross-cultural mtelh gibility, and (c) the necessity of translatabihty for ascribing beliefs to others and making them intelligible to us. Here all three points are reaffirmed as essential to the social sciences. Specifically it is argued that radical relativism cannot (i) dislodge the invariance of logic, or (ii) dispose of the possibility and necessity of translation, upon which the 'strong programme' is predicated.

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