Environmental cooperation: contrasting international environmental agreements

This conceptual paper investigates two paired environmental treaties. At the global level, the effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol on reducing ozone depleters is contrasted with the ineffectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol on curbing greenhouse gases (GHGs). Even though curbing ozone shield depletion and reducing GHGs are quintessential global public goods, the outcomes of these treaties are drastically different. This paper explores why. At the regional level, the success of the Helsinki Protocol on reducing sulfur emissions is contrasted with the slower and less profound success of the Sofia Protocol on limiting nitrogen oxides. These paired comparisons demonstrate how effective international cooperation transcends the properties of public goods, thereby encompassing other identified drivers. The paper also contrasts the regional and global paired treaties. Concluding remarks indicate some useful insights for designing effective international environmental agreements.

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