Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay

This monograph explores the relation between corporate governance and executive compensation and evaluates the conditions under which shareholders can bene.t from the right to interfere with the pay setting process by voting on the compensation proposed by the board of directors (Say on Pay). The first part of the monograph lays out the theoretical framework. The second part provides an overview of the origins and country-specific differences in Say on Pay regulation and a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical literature on the subject.

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