Young infants have biological expectations about animals

Significance We provide an experimental demonstration that young infants possess abstract biological expectations about animals. Our findings represent a major breakthrough in the study of the foundations of human knowledge. In four experiments, 8-mo-old infants expected novel objects they categorized as animals to have filled insides. Thus, infants detected a violation when objects that were self-propelled and agentive were revealed to be hollow, or when an object that was self-propelled and furry rattled when shaken, as though mostly hollow. We describe possible characterizations of infants’ expectations about animals’ insides, including a characterization that emphasizes human predator–prey adaptations. We also discuss how infants’ expectation that animals have insides lays a foundation for the development of more advanced biological knowledge. What are the developmental origins of our concept of animal? There has long been controversy concerning this question. At issue is whether biological reasoning develops from earlier forms of reasoning, such as physical and psychological reasoning, or whether from a young age children endow animals with biological properties. Here we demonstrate that 8-mo-old infants already expect novel objects they identify as animals to have insides. Infants detected a violation when an object that was self-propelled and agentive (but not an object that lacked one or both of these properties) was revealed to be hollow. Infants also detected a violation when an object that was self-propelled and furry (but not an object that lacked one or both of these properties) either was shown to be hollow or rattled (when shaken) as although mostly hollow. Young infants’ expectations about animals’ insides may serve as a foundation for the development of more advanced biological knowledge.

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