Influence in Weighted Committees

A committee's decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted voting method, and so does the distribution of power among the committee members. We investigate how different aggregation methods such as plurality runoff, Borda count, or Copeland rule map asymmetric numbers of seats, shares, voting weights, etc. to influence on outcomes when preferences vary. A generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf power index is proposed and applied to the IMF Executive Board's election of a Managing Director, extending a priori voting power analysis from binary simple voting games to choice in weighted committees.

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