The ‘heuristics and biases’ bias in expert elicitation

Summary.  In the early 1970s Tversky and Kahneman published a series of papers on ‘heuristics and biases’ describing human inadequacies in assessing probabilities, culminating in a highly popular article in Science. This seminal research has been heavily cited in many fields, including statistics, as the definitive research on probability assessment. Curiously, although this work was debated at the time and more recent work has largely refuted many of the claims, this apparent heuristics and biases bias in elicitation research has gone unremarked. Over a decade of research into the frequency effect, the importance of framing, and cognitive models more generally, has been almost completely ignored by the statistical literature on expert elicitation. To remedy this situation, this review offers a guide to the psychological research on assessing probabilities, both old and new, and gives concrete guidelines for eliciting expert knowledge.

[1]  Bani K. Mallick,et al.  Bayesian Graphical Models , 2009 .

[2]  R. Grimes Onward , 2016, Journal of environmental health.

[3]  M. Kynn Designing ELICITOR : Software to graphically elicit expert priors for logistic regression models in ecology . 2006 , 2006 .

[4]  A. O'Hagan,et al.  Statistical Methods for Eliciting Probability Distributions , 2005 .

[5]  Yujing Ni,et al.  Teaching and Learning Fraction and Rational Numbers: The Origins and Implications of Whole Number Bias , 2005 .

[6]  B. Newell Re-visions of rationality? , 2005, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[7]  Jeffrey M. Stibel,et al.  Frequency illusions and other fallacies , 2003 .

[8]  T. Rakow,et al.  Improving calibration without training: the role of task information , 2003 .

[9]  Derek J. Koehler,et al.  An evidential support accumulation model of subjective probability , 2003, Cognitive Psychology.

[10]  G. Miller The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective , 2003, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[11]  A. Kühberger The Rationality of Risky Decisions A Changing Message , 2002 .

[12]  Vittorio Girotto,et al.  Chances and frequencies in probabilistic reasoning: rejoinder to Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss, and Martignon , 2002, Cognition.

[13]  Mihnea Moldoveanu,et al.  False memories of the future: a critique of the applications of probabilistic reasoning to the study of cognitive processes. , 2002, Psychological review.

[14]  Johnnie E. V. Johnson,et al.  Calibration of Subjective Probability Judgments in a Naturalistic Setting. , 2001, Organizational behavior and human decision processes.

[15]  D. Kahneman,et al.  Do Frequency Representations Eliminate Conjunction Effects? An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration , 2001, Psychological science.

[16]  P. H. Garthwaite,et al.  Prior distribution assessment for a multivariate normal distribution: An experimental study , 2001 .

[17]  Anthony O'Hagan,et al.  Quantifying expert opinion in the UK water industry: an experimental study , 2000 .

[18]  Peter B. M. Vranas,et al.  Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky , 2000, Cognition.

[19]  E. Levine,et al.  The Construct Validity of Task Inventory Ratings: A Multitrait-Multimethod Analysis , 2000 .

[20]  Gerd Gigerenzer,et al.  The "conjunction fallacy" revisited : How intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors , 1999 .

[21]  K. Teigen,et al.  The Directionality of Verbal Probability Expressions: Effects on Decisions, Predictions, and Probabilistic Reasoning. , 1999, Organizational behavior and human decision processes.

[22]  Jack B. Soll,et al.  Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask. , 1999, Organizational behavior and human decision processes.

[23]  Baruch Fischhoff,et al.  Fifty–fifty = 50%? , 1999 .

[24]  G. Gigerenzer,et al.  Overcoming difficulties in Bayesian reasoning: A reply to Lewis and Keren (1999) and Mellers and McGraw (1999). , 1999 .

[25]  A. Peter McGraw,et al.  How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning: Comment on Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) , 1999 .

[26]  G. Keren,et al.  On the difficulties underlying Bayesian reasoning: A comment on Gigerenzer and Hoffrage , 1999 .

[27]  Gerd Gigerenzer,et al.  Overcoming Difficulties in Bayesian Reasoning : A Reply to Lewis and Keren ( 1999 ) and Mellers and McGraw ( 1999 ) , 1999 .

[28]  Gerd Gigerenzer,et al.  Visions of rationality , 1998, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[29]  J. Kadane,et al.  Experiences in elicitation , 1998 .

[30]  Anthony O'Hagan,et al.  Eliciting expert beliefs in substantial practical applications , 1998 .

[31]  Michael Goldstein,et al.  Constructing partial prior specifications for models of complex physical systems , 1998 .

[32]  Elías Moreno,et al.  Estimating with incomplete count data A Bayesian approach , 1998 .

[33]  P. Garthwaite,et al.  An elicitation method for multivariate normal distributions , 1998 .

[34]  Juslin,et al.  The Calibration Issue: Theoretical Comments on Suantak, Bolger, and Ferrell (1996). , 1998, Organizational behavior and human decision processes.

[35]  Tilmann Betsch,et al.  Natural sampling and base-rate neglect , 1997 .

[36]  David M. Sanbonmatsu,et al.  The Subjective Beliefs Underlying Probability Overestimation , 1997 .

[37]  Nigel Harvey,et al.  Confidence in judgment , 1997, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[38]  A. Dirkzwager,et al.  Testing with Personal Probabilities: 11-Year-Olds Can Correctly Estimate their Personal Probabilities , 1996 .

[39]  R. Christensen,et al.  A New Perspective on Priors for Generalized Linear Models , 1996 .

[40]  Jonathan A. Tawn,et al.  A Bayesian Analysis of Extreme Rainfall Data , 1996 .

[41]  K. Teigen,et al.  Conjunction errors in the prediction of referendum outcomes: Effects of attitude and realism , 1996 .

[42]  W. Ferrell,et al.  The Hard-Easy Effect in Subjective Probability Calibration , 1996 .

[43]  D Kahneman,et al.  On the reality of cognitive illusions. , 1996, Psychological review.

[44]  G. Gigerenzer On Narrow Norms and Vague Heuristics: A Reply to Kahneman and Tversky (1996) , 1996 .

[45]  A. H. Murphy,et al.  Hailfinder: A Bayesian system for forecasting severe weather , 1996 .

[46]  J. Koehler The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges , 1996, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[47]  Robyn M. Dawes,et al.  The False Consensus Effect and Overconfidence: Flaws in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment? , 1996 .

[48]  C. Varey,et al.  Towards a Consensus on Overconfidence , 1996 .

[49]  L. Cosmides,et al.  Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty , 1996, Cognition.

[50]  S. Sloman The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. , 1996 .

[51]  Gerd Gigerenzer,et al.  How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats , 1995 .

[52]  A. Gelfand,et al.  Modeling Expert Opinion Arising as a Partial Probabilistic Specification , 1995 .

[53]  D. Madigan,et al.  Eliciting prior information to enhance the predictive performance of Bayesian graphical models , 1995 .

[54]  A. Tversky,et al.  Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability. , 1994 .

[55]  I. Erev,et al.  Simultaneous Over- and Underconfidence: The Role of Error in Judgment Processes. , 1994 .

[56]  Leslie B. Hammer,et al.  Effects of Cognitive Feedback Components, Display Format, and Elaboration on Performance , 1994 .

[57]  David J. Spiegelhalter,et al.  Empirical evaluation of prior beliefs about frequencies : methodology and a case study in congenital heart disease , 1994 .

[58]  P. Juslin The Overconfidence Phenomenon as a Consequence of Informal Experimenter-Guided Selection of Almanac Items , 1994 .

[59]  George Wright,et al.  Assessing the quality of expert judgment: Issues and analysis , 1994, Decis. Support Syst..

[60]  Paul H. Garthwaite,et al.  Assessment of prior distributions for regression models: an experimental study , 1994 .

[61]  G. Gigerenzer Why the distinction between single-event probabilities and frequencies is important for psychology (and vice versa). , 1994 .

[62]  William R. Ferrell,et al.  Discrete subjective probabilities and decision analysis: Elicitation, calibration and combination. , 1994 .

[63]  Thomas A. Louis,et al.  Graphical Elicitation of a Prior Distribution for a Clinical Trial , 1993 .

[64]  K. Craik,et al.  Is There a Citation Bias in the Judgment and Decision Literature , 1993 .

[65]  J. Shanteau Competence in experts: The role of task characteristics , 1992 .

[66]  Ward Edwards,et al.  Discussion: Of human skills , 1992 .

[67]  Leslie B. Hammer,et al.  Task information, cognitive information, or functional validity information: Which components of cognitive feedback affect performance?☆ , 1992 .

[68]  Duane Steffey,et al.  Hierarchical bayesian modeling with elicited prior information , 1992 .

[69]  G. Keren Calibration and probability judgements: Conceptual and methodological issues , 1991 .

[70]  G. Gigerenzer,et al.  Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence. , 1991, Psychological review.

[71]  G. Gigerenzer From Tools to Theories: A Heuristic of Discovery in Cognitive Psychology. , 1991 .

[72]  Lola L. Lopes The Rhetoric of Irrationality , 1991 .

[73]  M H Birnbaum,et al.  Judgments of proportions. , 1990, Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and performance.

[74]  H. A. Taylor,et al.  The conjunction fallacy? , 1990, Memory & cognition.

[75]  M. Doherty,et al.  Effects of cognitive feedback on performance. , 1989 .

[76]  R. Gebotys,et al.  Errors in the quantification of uncertainty: A product of heuristics or minimal probability knowledge base? , 1989 .

[77]  K. Fiedler The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors , 1988 .

[78]  Paul H. Garthwaite,et al.  Quantifying Expert Opinion in Linear Regression Problems , 1988 .

[79]  W. Thompson,et al.  Interpretation of statistical evidence in criminal trials , 1987 .

[80]  Gideon Keren,et al.  Facing uncertainty in the game of bridge: A calibration study , 1987 .

[81]  Lee Roy Beach,et al.  Beyond heuristics and biases: A contingency model of judgemental forecasting , 1986 .

[82]  L. Beach,et al.  The citation bias: Fad and fashion in the judgment and decision literature. , 1984 .

[83]  A. Tversky,et al.  Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment , 1983 .

[84]  D. Krantz,et al.  The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning , 1983 .

[85]  John B. Kidd,et al.  Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biasses , 1983 .

[86]  David V. Budescu,et al.  Encoding subjective probabilities: A psychological and psychometric review , 1983 .

[87]  A. Tversky,et al.  A reply to Evans , 1982, Cognition.

[88]  J. S. Evans,et al.  On statistical intuitions and inferential rules: A discussion of Kahneman and Tversky , 1982, Cognition.

[89]  A. Dawid The Well-Calibrated Bayesian , 1982 .

[90]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  Calibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980 , 1982 .

[91]  Ward Edwards,et al.  Judgment under uncertainty: Conservatism in human information processing , 1982 .

[92]  H. Raiffa,et al.  Judgment under uncertainty: A progress report on the training of probability assessors , 1982 .

[93]  Maya Bar-Hillel Judgment under uncertainty: Studies of representativeness , 1982 .

[94]  D. V. Gokhale,et al.  Assessment of a Prior Distribution for the Correlation Coefficient in a Bivariate Normal Distribution , 1982 .

[95]  A. Tversky,et al.  Variants of uncertainty , 1982, Cognition.

[96]  A. Tversky,et al.  On the study of statistical intuitions , 1982, Cognition.

[97]  A. Tversky,et al.  Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures , 1982 .

[98]  L. Cohen Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? , 1981, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[99]  L. Cohen,et al.  Whose is the fallacy? A rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky , 1980, Cognition.

[100]  Wayne S. Smith,et al.  Interactive Elicitation of Opinion for a Normal Linear Model , 1980 .

[101]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  Training for calibration. , 1980 .

[102]  L. Cohen,et al.  On the psychology of prediction: Whose is the fallacy? , 1979, Cognition.

[103]  A. Tversky,et al.  On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen , 1979, Cognition.

[104]  H. H. Clark,et al.  Psychology and language : an introduction to psycholinguistics , 1979 .

[105]  A. Tversky,et al.  On the Reconciliation of Probability Assessments , 1979 .

[106]  A. H. Murphy,et al.  Reliability of Subjective Probability Forecasts of Precipitation and Temperature , 1977 .

[107]  Robert L. Winkler Rewarding Expertise in Probability Assessment , 1977 .

[108]  T. Fine,et al.  The Emergence of Probability , 1976 .

[109]  Carl-Axel S. Staël von Holstein,et al.  Exceptional Paper---Probability Encoding in Decision Analysis , 1975 .

[110]  W. Edwards Cognitive Processes and the Assessment of Subjective Probability Distributions: Comment , 1975 .

[111]  Robin M. Hogarth,et al.  Cognitive Processes and the Assessment of Subjective Probability Distributions , 1975 .

[112]  B. Fischhoff,et al.  I knew it would happen: Remembered probabilities of once—future things , 1975 .

[113]  A. Tversky,et al.  Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases , 1974, Science.

[114]  George P. Huber,et al.  METHODS FOR QUANTIFYING SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES AND MULTI‐ATTRIBUTE UTILITIES*† , 1974 .

[115]  A. H. Murphy,et al.  Experiments in the laboratory and the real world , 1973 .

[116]  Daniel Kahneman,et al.  Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability , 1973 .

[117]  H. Thomas,et al.  Subjective Probability and its Measurement , 1973 .

[118]  A. Tversky,et al.  On the psychology of prediction , 1973 .

[119]  A. Tversky,et al.  Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness , 1972 .

[120]  William K. Estes,et al.  Research and Theory on the Learning of Probabilities , 1972 .

[121]  L. J. Savage Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations , 1971 .

[122]  A. Tversky,et al.  BELIEF IN THE LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS , 1971, Pediatrics.

[123]  Richard G. Lathrop,et al.  A note on intuitive estimations of probabilities about normally distributed populations , 1970 .

[124]  James A. Wise,et al.  Sample proportions and subjective probability revisions , 1970 .

[125]  Carl-Axel S. Staël von Holstein,et al.  Measurement of subjective probability , 1970 .

[126]  Bruno de Finetti,et al.  Logical foundations and measurement of subjective probability , 1970 .

[127]  Wolfgang Manz,et al.  Experiments on probabilistic information processing , 1970 .

[128]  A. H. Murphy,et al.  Scoring rules in probability assessment and evaluation , 1970 .

[129]  Lawrence D. Phillips,et al.  The ‘true probability’ problem , 1970 .

[130]  David M. Messick,et al.  Learning probabilities of events: A discussion , 1970 .

[131]  Charles A.J. Vlek,et al.  Learning probabilities of events: An analysis of the problem and its relevance for the study of decision making , 1970 .

[132]  Sarah Lichtenstein,et al.  The importance of the data-generating model in probability estimation☆ , 1968 .

[133]  R. L. Winkler The Quantification of Judgment: Some Methodological Suggestions , 1967 .

[134]  R. L. Winkler The Assessment of Prior Distributions in Bayesian Analysis , 1967 .

[135]  L. Beach,et al.  Man as an Intuitive Statistician , 2022 .

[136]  E. Brunswik Perception and the Representative Design of Psychological Experiments , 1957 .

[137]  E. Brunswik Organismic achievement and environmental probability. , 1943 .