Computational Social Choice: The First Ten Years and Beyond

Computational social choice is a research area at the intersection of computer science, mathematics, and economics that is concerned with aggregation of preferences of multiple agents. Typical applications include voting, resource allocation, and fair division. This chapter highlights six representative research areas in contemporary computational social choice: restricted preference domains, voting equilibria and iterative voting, multiwinner voting, probabilistic social choice, random assignment, and computer-aided theorem proving.

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