Measuring the Willingness to Pay to Avoid Guilt: Estimation Using Equilibrium and Stated Belief Models
暂无分享,去创建一个
Charles Bellemare | Alexander Sebald | Martin Strobel | Charles Bellemare | Alexander Sebald | Martin Strobel
[1] David Kjellberg. Measuring Expectations , 1999, Identification Problems in the Social Sciences.
[2] R. Dawes. Statistical criteria for establishing a truly false consensus effect , 1989 .
[3] Tore Ellingsen,et al. Testing guilt aversion , 2010, Games Econ. Behav..
[4] Link,et al. Is the Quadratic Scoring Rule really incentive compatible? , 2001 .
[5] Gary Charness,et al. Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental Games , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[6] Pierpaolo Battigalli,et al. Dynamic Psychological Games , 2005, J. Econ. Theory.
[7] J. Kagel,et al. Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game , 2001 .
[8] Gerd Gigerenzer,et al. Communicating Statistical Information , 2000, Science.
[9] Dirk Engelmann,et al. The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given , 2000 .
[10] Christoph Vanberg,et al. WHY DO PEOPLE KEEP THEIR PROMISES? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF TWO EXPLANATIONS , 2008 .
[11] John C. Harsanyi,et al. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III: Part I. The Basic Model& , 2004, Manag. Sci..
[12] Robyn M. Dawes,et al. The potential nonfalsity of the false consensus effect. , 1990 .
[13] L. Ross,et al. The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes , 1977 .
[14] Dominic W. Massaro,et al. Understanding variability in binary and continuous choice , 1998 .
[15] Ernst Fehr,et al. Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter , 2000, Games Econ. Behav..
[16] E. Damme,et al. Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study. , 1998, Journal of mathematical psychology.
[17] The False Consensus Effect Disappears if Representative Information and Monetary Incentives Are Given , 2000 .
[18] Martin Dufwenberg,et al. A theory of sequential reciprocity , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[19] Martin Dufwenberg,et al. Promises and Partnership , 2006 .
[20] Werner G. Müller,et al. Optimal Design of an Experiment in Economics , 1996 .
[21] K. Train. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation , 2003 .
[22] Pierpaolo Battigalli,et al. Guilt in Games , 2007 .
[23] Martin Dufwenberg,et al. Promises and Partnership , 2006 .
[24] Charles Bellemare,et al. On Representative Social Capital , 2004, SSRN Electronic Journal.
[25] Charles Bellemare,et al. MEASURING INEQUITY AVERSION IN A HETEROGENEOUS POPULATION USING EXPERIMENTAL DECISIONS AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES , 2008 .