Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Paul Oyer,et al. Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality , 1998 .
[2] Michael D. Frakes. The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules , 2013 .
[3] David C. Chan. The Efficiency of Slacking Off: Evidence from the Emergency Department , 2015 .
[4] D. Harhoff,et al. Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Innovation , 1997 .
[5] Michael D. Frakes,et al. The Failed Promise of User Fees: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office , 2014 .
[6] Douglas Lichtman,et al. Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel , 2003 .
[7] Gerald Marschke,et al. An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Performance , 1997 .
[8] George P. Baker,et al. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts , 1994 .
[9] Joshua Lerner,et al. Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It , 2011 .
[10] Mark A. Schankerman,et al. Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts , 2013 .
[11] Bronwyn H Hall,et al. Market value and patent citations , 2005 .
[12] Beth J. Asch. Do Incentives Matter? The Case of Navy Recruiters , 1990 .
[13] Mark A. Lemley,et al. Patent Quality and Settlement among Repeat Patent Litigants , 2010 .
[14] Mark A. Lemley. Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office , 2001 .
[15] Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,et al. Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality , 2011 .
[16] Petra Moser,et al. How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century World Fairs , 2003 .
[17] David C. Chan. Teamwork and Moral Hazard: Evidence from the Emergency Department , 2016, Journal of Political Economy.
[18] Michael D. Frakes,et al. Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns , 2012 .
[19] Josh Lerner,et al. The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature , 1997 .
[20] Paul R. Milgrom,et al. Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design , 1991 .
[21] Ian Larkin,et al. The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales , 2013, Journal of Labor Economics.
[22] Mark A. Lemley,et al. Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? , 2012 .
[23] Rob Alessie,et al. Life satisfaction and age: Dealing with underidentification in age-period-cohort models. , 2011, Social science & medicine.
[24] S. Scotchmer,et al. Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law , 1991 .
[25] James J. Heckman,et al. Using Longitudinal Data to Estimate Age, Period and Cohort Effects in Earnings Equations , 1985 .
[26] E. Mansfield. Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study , 1986 .
[27] Michael D. Frakes,et al. The Failed Promise of User Fees: Empirical Evidence from the United States Patent and Trademark Office , 2013 .
[28] Ronald J. Mann. The Idiosyncrasy of Patent Examiners: Effects of Experience and Attrition , 2014 .
[29] Gerald Marschke,et al. An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives , 2002, Journal of Labor Economics.
[30] Mark A. Lemley,et al. The Patent Crisis and How Courts Can Solve It , 2009 .
[31] Mark A. Lemley,et al. Examiner Characteristics and Patent Office Outcomes , 2009, Review of Economics and Statistics.
[32] James E. Bessen,et al. Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk , 2008 .
[33] Z. Griliches. Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: a Survey , 1990 .
[34] Michael D. Frakes,et al. Does the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment , 2014 .
[35] Bhaven N. Sampat,et al. When Do Applicants Search for Prior Art? , 2010, The Journal of Law and Economics.