论文信息 - Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems

Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems

Abstract A characterization theorem of the core of two-sided matching problems is proved. The theorem characterizes the core by means of four axioms, the Pareto optimality, consistency, converse consistency, and anonymity. It is shown that all of them are logically independent.

Manabu Toda | Hiroo Sasaki | M. Toda | Hiroo Sasaki

[1] J. Nash. THE BARGAINING PROBLEM , 1950, Classics in Game Theory.

[2] J. Harsanyi. A bargaining model for the cooperative n-person game , 1958 .

[3] Bezalel Peleg,et al. An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments , 1985 .

[4] L. Shapley,et al. College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage , 1962 .

[5] W. Thomson,et al. Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents , 1989 .

[6] Alvin E. Roth,et al. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis , 1990 .

[7] B. Peleg. On the reduced game property and its converse , 1986 .