A brief look at the security of DeviceNet communication in industrial control systems

Security is a vital aspect of industrial control systems since they are used in critical infrastructures and manufacturing processes. As demonstrated by the increasing number of emerging exploits, securing such systems is still a challenge as the employed fieldbus technologies do not offer intrinsic support for basic security objectives. In this work we discuss some security aspects of DeviceNet, a communication protocol widely used for control applications especially in the North American industrial sector. Having the Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol at its base, DeviceNet inherits all the vulnerabilities that were already illustrated on CAN in-vehicle communication. We discuss how the lack of security in DeviceNet can be exploited and point on the fact that these vulnerabilities can be modelled by existing formal verification tools and countermeasures can be put in place.

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