Braess's Paradox, Fibonacci Numbers, and Exponential Inapproximability
暂无分享,去创建一个
Tim Roughgarden | Éva Tardos | Henry C. Lin | Asher Walkover | T. Roughgarden | É. Tardos | Henry C. Lin | Asher Walkover
[1] José R. Correa,et al. Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4447-03 November 2003 Computational Complexity , Fairness , and the Price of Anarchy of the Maximum Latency Problem , 2003 .
[2] John N. Tsitsiklis,et al. Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation game: the case of elastic supply , 2004, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
[3] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Selfish routing and the price of anarchy , 2005 .
[4] T. Koopmans,et al. Studies in the Economics of Transportation. , 1956 .
[5] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Designing networks for selfish users is hard , 2001, Proceedings 2001 IEEE International Conference on Cluster Computing.
[6] David S. Johnson,et al. Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness , 1978 .
[7] Adrian Vetta,et al. Nash equilibria in competitive societies, with applications to facility location, traffic routing and auctions , 2002, The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings..
[8] Scott Shenker,et al. On a network creation game , 2003, PODC '03.
[9] Artur Czumaj. Selfish Routing on the Internet , 2004, Handbook of Scheduling.
[10] Tim Roughgarden. The maximum latency of selfish routing , 2004, SODA '04.
[11] Martin Gairing,et al. Selfish Routing in Non-Cooperative Networks: A Survey , 2003, Bull. EATCS.
[12] Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al. Algorithms, Games, and the Internet , 2001, ICALP.
[13] Dietrich Braess,et al. Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung , 1968, Unternehmensforschung.
[14] M. Safari. Price of Anarchy ⋆ , 2005 .
[15] Tim Roughgarden,et al. The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology , 2002, STOC '02.
[16] G. Perakis,et al. The Price of Anarchy when Costs Are Non-separable and Asymmetric , 2004, IPCO.
[17] Tim Roughgarden,et al. A stronger bound on Braess's Paradox , 2004, SODA '04.
[18] Jacques Carlier,et al. Handbook of Scheduling - Algorithms, Models, and Performance Analysis , 2004 .
[19] Joseph Y.-T. Leung,et al. Handbook of Scheduling: Algorithms, Models, and Performance Analysis , 2004 .
[20] Éva Tardos,et al. Near-optimal network design with selfish agents , 2003, STOC '03.
[21] Tim Roughgarden,et al. How bad is selfish routing? , 2000, Proceedings 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
[22] José R. Correa,et al. Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4319-03 June 2003 Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks , 2022 .
[23] Roberto Grossi,et al. Mathematical Foundations Of Computer Science 2003 , 2003 .
[24] Nikhil R. Devanur,et al. Price of Anarchy, Locality Gap, and a Network Service Provider Game , 2005, WINE.
[25] Kwang Mong Sim,et al. The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands , 2003, Oper. Res. Lett..
[26] Tim Roughgarden,et al. Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games , 2004, Games Econ. Behav..
[27] Mike Smith,et al. The existence, uniqueness and stability of traffic equilibria , 1979 .