Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design

The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on “Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design” of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism design literature. We then introduce the papers that are contained in the Symposium issue and finally conclude by discussing avenues for future research. Several of the papers contained in the Symposium issue were presented at the Economic Theory Workshop of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University in June 2013.

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