AUTHSCAN: Automatic Extraction of Web Authentication Protocols from Implementations

Ideally, security protocol implementations should be formally verified before they are deployed. However, this is not true in practice. Numerous high-profile vulnerabilities have been found in web authentication protocol implementations, especially in single-sign on (SSO) protocols implementations recently. Much of the prior work on authentication protocol verification has focused on theoretical foundations and building scalable verification tools for checking manually-crafted specifications [17, 18, 44]. In this paper, we address a complementary problem of automatically extracting specifications from implementations. We propose AUTHSCAN, an end-to-end platform to automatically recover authentication protocol specifications from their implementations. AUTHSCAN finds a total of 7 security vulnerabilities using off-the-shelf verification tools in specifications it recovers, which include SSO protocol implementations and custom web authentication logic of web sites with millions of users.

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