Market Implementation of Multiple-Arrival Multiple-Deadline Differentiated Energy Services

An increasing concern in power systems is on how to elicit flexibilities in demands for better supply/demand balance. To this end, several differentiated energy services have been put forward, wherein demands are discriminated by their different flexibility levels. Motivated by the duration-differentiated energy services, we have proposed energy services differentiated by durations, arrival times, and deadlines. The purpose of this paper is to study the market implementation of such multiple-arrival multiple-deadline differentiated energy services. To verify the economic feasibility, we establish that in a forward market, there exists an efficient competitive equilibrium which attains the maximum social welfare. In addition, we show that future information will influence current decisions on power delivery by studying a special kind of causal allocation policy. Finally, we propose two tractable integer programs, namely the optimal arbitrage and the minimum-cost allocation problems, which can be embedded in a two-level hierarchical real-time implementation of differentiated energy services.