Persistent equilibria in strategic games
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A perfect equilibrium [Selten] can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium with certain properties of local stability. Simple examples show that a stronger notion of local stability is needed to eliminate unreasonable Nash equilibria. The persistent equilibrium is such a notion. Properties of this solution are studied. In particular, it is shown that in each strategic game there exists a pesistent equilibrium which is perfect and proper.
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[2] R. Myerson. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept , 1978 .
[3] John C. Harsanyi. Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part II : Analysis of specific bargaining games , 1982, Math. Soc. Sci..