A leader-follower model and analysis for a two-stage network of oligopolies

This paper is concerned with the existence, uniqueness and computation of leader-follower equilibrium solutions for an industry involved with two major stages of production. We assume that there exists one set of firms performing the first stage of production, which produces a semi-finished product. This semi-finished product is converted to a final good by a second set of firms performing the second stage of production. Furthermore, also competing in the final product market is a third set of firms, which are vertically integrated through the two stages of production and which are assumed to lead the second set of firms by explicitly considering the reaction or response of these latter firms to their own outputs. We model such an industry as a two-stage network of oligopolies, and define equilibrium solutions based on assumed market structures. Our analysis examines the existence and uniqueness of such equilibrium solutions, characterizes the nature of the production strategies of the various firms at an equilibrium, and prescribes algorithms to compute such solutions. This provides the machinery required to perform sensitivity analyses for studying the effects of various mergers or integrations on individual firm profits, and on the industry outputs and prices at equilibrium. The presentation is self-contained, and does not necessarily require any significant prior preparation in economic theory on the part of the reader.

[1]  J. Nash NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES , 1951, Classics in Game Theory.

[2]  H. Ohta,et al.  Vertical Integration of Successive Oligopolists , 1979 .

[3]  S. Yakowitz,et al.  A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium , 1977 .

[4]  Dave Furth,et al.  The stability of generalised stackelberg equilibria in heterogeneous oligopoly , 1979 .

[5]  W. Novshek Finding All n-Firm Cournot Equilibria , 1984 .

[6]  Hiroshi Ohta,et al.  Related Market Conditions and Interindustrial Mergers , 1976 .

[7]  Ferenc Szidarovszky,et al.  Contributions to Cournot oligopoly theory , 1982 .

[8]  Koji Okuguchi,et al.  The stability of price adjusting oligopoly with conjectural variations , 1978 .

[9]  Hanif D. Sherali,et al.  A mathematical programming approach for determining oligopolistic market equilibrium , 1982, Math. Program..

[10]  James W. Friedman,et al.  Oligopoly and the theory of games , 1977 .

[11]  Hanif D. Sherali,et al.  A Mathematical Programming Approach to a Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Analysis for a Two-Stage Network of Oligopolies , 1988, Oper. Res..

[12]  Hanif D. Sherali,et al.  Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations , 1983, Oper. Res..

[13]  Hanif D. Sherali,et al.  A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis , 1984, Oper. Res..

[14]  M. Perry,et al.  Related Market Conditions and Interindustrial Mergers: Comment , 1978 .

[15]  Augustin M. Cournot Cournot, Antoine Augustin: Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses , 2019, Die 100 wichtigsten Werke der Ökonomie.

[16]  Joanna M. Leleno A mathematical programming-based analysis of a two stage model of interacting producers , 1987 .

[17]  Christine A. Shoemaker,et al.  Determining Optimal Use of Resources among Regional Producers under Differing Levels of Cooperation , 1980, Oper. Res..

[18]  Koji Okuguchi,et al.  Expectations and stability in oligopoly models , 1976 .

[19]  H. Stackelberg,et al.  Marktform und Gleichgewicht , 1935 .