论文信息 - An alternative characterization of the equal-distance rule for allocation problems with single-peaked preferences - 字舞流文

An alternative characterization of the equal-distance rule for allocation problems with single-peaked preferences

Abstract The main result of this paper is that for allocation problems in which preferences are single-peaked, the equal distance rule is the only rule satisfying symmetry, efficiency, dummy, agenda-independence, and constrained linearity.

Carmen Herrero | Antonio Villar | Carmen Herrero | A. Villar

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