An Efficient Game Form for Unicast Service Provisioning

We consider the decentralized bandwidth/rate allocation problem in unicast service provisioning with strategic users. We present a mechanism/game form which possesses the following properties when the users' utilities are concave: (1) It implements in Nash equilibria the solution of the corresponding centralized rate allocation problem in unicast service provisioning. (2) It is individually rational. (3) It is budget-balanced at all Nash equilibria of the game induced by the mechanism/game form as well as off equilibrium. When the users' utilities are quasi-concave the mechanism possesses properties (2) and (3) stated above. Moreover, every Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the proposed mechanism results in a Walrasian equilibrium.

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