Distributed Control with Collective Intelligence

We consider systems of interacting reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms that do not work at cross purposes , in that their collective behavior maximizes a global utility function. We call such systems COllective INtelligences (COINs). We present the theory of designing COINs. Then we present experiments validating that theory in the context of two distributed control problems: We show that COINs perform near-optimally in a difficult variant of Arthur's bar problem [Arthur] (and in particular avoid the tragedy of the commons for that problem), and we also illustrate optimal performance in the master-slave problem.

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