Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria

We consider agents who do not have any information about others' preferences. In this situation they attempt to behave such as to maximize their chances to obtain their most preferred alternative. This defines a solution concept for games symmetrical to Barbera and Dutta's protective equilibrium, the demanding equilibrium. Necessary and sufficient conditions for self implementation in demanding equilibria (side) of social choice functions are provided.

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