Physical Security Bounds Against Tampering

We consider the problem of an active adversary physically manipulating computations of a cryptographic device that is implemented in circuitry. Which kind of circuit based security can ever be guaranteed if all computations are vulnerable towards fault injection? In this paper, we define physical security parameters against tampering adversaries. Therefore, we present an adversarial model with a strong focus on fault injection techniques based on radiation and particle impact. Physical implementation strategies to counteract tampering attempts are discussed.

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