Graph-based coalitional games: an analysis via characteristics

In this paper we motivate a new approach to analyse the computational complexity of solution concepts and playerbased properties, as well as other properties of coalitional games. This approach is based on the idea to abstract away from detailed game representations to analyse games via standard complexity proofs, towards a more abstract approach, where games are analysed by focusing on inuential characteristics of related games. The core of this structurecentered perspective on coalitional games is to determine and systematically analyse promising characteristics, so that they can be used later to analyse games of a similar type. This may be particularly interesting in a well-restricted class of games, like in the context of networks. To give a rst ex

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