Belief Revision and Dynamic Logic

We explore belief change policies in a modal dynamic logic that explicitly delineates knowledge, belief, plausibility and the dynamics of these notions. Taking a Kripke semantics counterpart to Grove semantics for AGM as a starting point, we analyse belief in a basic modal language containing epistemic and doxastic modal- ities. We critically discuss some philosophical presuppositions underlying various modelling assumptions commonly made in the literature, such as the limit assump- tion and negative introspection for knowledge. Finally, we introduce in the language a general dynamic mechanism and define various policies of iterated belief expansion, revision, contraction and two-dimensional belief change operations.

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