The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem

An instance of the asymmetric matrix partition problem consists of a matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}_+^{n \times m}$ and a probability distribution p over its columns. The goal is to find a partition scheme that maximizes the resulting partition value. A partition scheme $\mathcal{S} = \{ \mathcal{S}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{S}_{n}\}$ consists of a partition $\mathcal{S}_i$ of [m] for each row i of the matrix. The partition $\mathcal{S}_i$ can be interpreted as a smoothing operator on row i, which replaces the value of each entry in that row with the expected value in the partition subset that contains it. Given a scheme $\mathcal{S}$ that induces a smoothed matrix A', the partition value is the expected maximum column entry of A'. We establish that this problem is already APX-hard for the seemingly simple setting in which A is binary and p is uniform. We then demonstrate that a constant factor approximation can be achieved in most cases of interest. Later on, we discuss the symmetric version of the problem, in which one must employ an identical partition for all rows, and prove that it is essentially trivial. Our matrix partition problem draws its interest from several applications like broad matching in sponsored search advertising and information revelation in market settings. We conclude by discussing the latter application in depth.

[1]  Sergei Vassilvitskii,et al.  To Match or Not to Match , 2015, ACM Trans. Economics and Comput..

[2]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization , 2012, TEAC.

[3]  Miroslav Chleb ´ ik,et al.  Approximation Hardness for Small Occurrence Instances of NP-Hard Problems , 2003 .

[4]  J. Sobel,et al.  STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION , 1982 .

[5]  Miroslav Chlebík,et al.  Approximation Hardness for Small Occurrence Instances of NP-Hard Problems , 2003, CIAC.

[6]  Shmuel Zamir,et al.  The Strategic Use of Seller Information in Private-Value Auctions , 2000 .

[7]  D. Austen-Smith Information transmission in debate , 1990 .

[8]  Yossi Feinberg,et al.  Games with Unawareness , 2012 .

[9]  Leandro Chaves Rêgo,et al.  Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players , 2007, TARK '07.

[10]  Fan Chung Graham,et al.  Internet and Network Economics, Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, San Diego, CA, USA, December 12-14, 2007, Proceedings , 2007, WINE.

[11]  Peter Bro Miltersen,et al.  Send mixed signals: earn more, work less , 2012, EC '12.

[12]  Leandro Chaves Rêgo,et al.  Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players , 2012, Int. J. Game Theory.

[13]  David S. Johnson,et al.  Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness , 1978 .

[14]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  A theory of auctions and competitive bidding , 1982 .

[15]  Paul R. Milgrom,et al.  The value of information in a sealed-bid auction , 1982 .

[16]  Arpita Ghosh,et al.  Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search , 2007, WINE.