Applying evolutionary game theory to auction mechanism design

We describe an evolution-based method for evaluating auction mechanisms, and apply it to a space of mechanisms including the standard first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions. We replicate results known already in the auction theory literature regarding the suitability of different mechanisms for different bidder environments, and extend the literature by establishing the superiority of novel mechanisms over standard mechanisms, for commonly occurring scenarios. Thus this paper simultaneously extends auction theory, and provides a systematic method for further such extensions.

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