Why governments comply: an integrative compliance model that bridges the gap between instrumental and normative models of compliance

Why do governments comply with costly rulings handed down by international courts? This article focuses upon governmental compliance with ECJ rulings. The argument is that we cannot explain compliance based solely upon the instrumental calculations of actors, but must also incorporate the normative dimension of law into our compliance model to explain why actors feel ‘compelled’ to follow ECJ rulings even in the absence of manifest instrumental incentives. At the same time we must not lose sight of the significant analytical insights of instrumental models. An integrative compliance model is therefore created based upon Giddens' structuration theory which argues that both instrumental and normative concerns motivate governmental actors in their compliance calculations. The analytical value-added of the model is illustrated upon the Working Time Directive case, where the instrumental strategy of the British government was blatant non-compliance, but where the social costs of breaking what was perceived to ...

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