Knowledge and Equilibrium

The basic model we consider works as follows. There are a set of states Ω, one of which is true. For each state ω ∈ Ω, and a given agent, there is a set of states h(ω) that the agent considers possible when the actual state is ω. Finally, we will say that an agent knows E if E obtains at all the states that the agent believes are possible. These basic definitions will provide a language for talking about reasoning and the implications of reasoning.

[1]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  Learning and Belief Based Trade , 2006 .

[2]  Yossi Feinberg,et al.  Subjective reasoning - dynamic games , 2005, Games Econ. Behav..

[3]  Ariel Rubinstein,et al.  A Comment on the Logic of 'Agreeing to Disagree' Type Results , 1988 .

[4]  R. Aumann.  Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality Author ( s ) , 1987 .

[5]  David M. Kreps.  A note on "fulfilled expectations" equilibria , 1977 .

[6]  M. Bacharach.  Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge , 1985 .

[7]  S. Morris.  Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning , 1996 .

[8]  Faruk Gul.  A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View , 1998 .

[9]  Yossi Feinberg,et al.  Subjective Reasoning in Dynamic Games , 2002 .

[10]  R. Aumann,et al.  Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium , 1995 .

[11]  Robert W. Cahn,et al.  The power of paradox , 1990, Nature.

[12]  A. Rubinstein.  The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under "Almost Common Knowledge" , 1989 .

[13]  Nancy L. Stokey,et al.  Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge , 1982 .

[14]  David M. Kreps,et al.  Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations , 1978 .

[15]  Wei Xiong,et al.  Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles , 2003, Journal of Political Economy.

[16]  L. Samuelson.  Modeling knowledge in economic analysis , 2004 .

[17]  R. Aumann.  Agreeing to disagree. , 1976, Nature cell biology.

[18]  J. Geanakoplos.  Game Theory Without Partitions, and Applications to Speculation and Consensus , 1989, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

[19]  Ronald Fagin,et al.  Reasoning about knowledge , 1995 .

[20]  Yossi Feinberg,et al.  Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[21]  Yossi Feinberg,et al.  Subjective reasoning - solutions , 2005, Games Econ. Behav..

[22]  J. Tirole.  On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations , 1982 .

[23]  D. Monderer,et al.  Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs , 1989 .