Overfishing Drivers and Opportunities for Recovery in Small-Scale Fisheries of the Midriff Islands Region, Gulf of California, Mexico: the Roles of Land and Sea Institutions in Fisheries Sustainability

Institutions play an important role in shaping individual incentives in complex social-ecological systems, by encouraging or discouraging resource overuse. In the Gulf of California, Mexico, there is widespread evidence of declines in small-scale fishery stocks, largely attributed to policy failures. We investigated formal and informal rules-in-use regulating access and resource use by small-scale fishers in the two most important fishing communities of the Midriff Islands region in the Gulf of California, which share several target species and fishing grounds. The Midriff Islands region is a highly productive area where sustainable use of fisheries resources has been elusive. Our study aimed to inform policy by providing information on how management and conservation policies perform in this unique environment. In addition, we contrast attributes of the enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons in an effort to better understand why these communities, albeit showing several contrasting attributes of the above conditions, have not developed sustainable fishing practices. We take a novel, comprehensive institutional approach that includes formal and informal institutions, incorporating links between land (i.e., communal land rights) and sea institutions (i.e., fisheries and conservation policies) and their effects on stewardship of fishery resources, a theme that is practically unaddressed in the literature. Insufficient government support in provision of secure rights, enforcement and sanctioning, and recognition and incorporation of local arrangements and capacities for management arose as important needs to address in both cases. We highlight the critical role of higher levels of governance, that when disconnected from local practices, realities, and needs, can be a major impediment to achieving sustainability in small-scale fisheries, even in cases where several facilitating conditions are met. RESUMEN. Resumen: Las instituciones desempenan un papel importante en la determinacion de los incentivos individuales en sistemas socio-ecologicos complejos, alentando o desalentando la sobreexplotacion. En el Golfo de California, Mexico, existe amplia evidencia de una marcada disminucion en la abundancia de recursos pesqueros de pequena escala o artesanales, atribuida a fracasos en las politicas de manejo. Este trabajo investiga las reglas formales e informales en uso para regular acceso y uso de recursos por parte de pescadores artesanales en las dos comunidades pesqueras mas importantes de la Region de las Grandes Islas, Golfo de California. A pesar de su elevada productividad biologica, el uso sustentable de los recursos marinos en esta region ha sido dificil de alcanzar. Este trabajo proporcionamo informacion para optimizar el desempeno de los instrumentos de manejo y conservacion de recursos marinos presentes en este ambiente unico. Ademas, contrastamos los atributos de las condiciones que facilitan la sustentabilidad en el uso de recursos de uso comun, para comprender mejor por que estas comunidades no han logrado incorporar de manera duradera practicas de pesca sustentables, a pesar de presentar, en el caso particular de una de ellas, varias condiciones propicias. Adoptamos un enfoque institucional novedoso e integral que incluye instituciones formales e informales, e incorpora los vinculos entre reglas relativas a la tenencia de la tierra (ej. derechos de uso comunales) y del ambito marino (de pesca y conservacion), y sus efectos sobre el cuidado de los recursos marinos, un topico practicamente sin abordar en la literatura. Surgen como limitantes importantes en ambos casos, un apoyo gubernamental insuficiente tanto en la provision de derechos de pesca seguros como en la fiscalizacion y la aplicacion de sanciones, y la falta de reconocimiento e incorporacion de arreglos institucionales y capacidades de manejo locales en instancias formales de decision. Resaltamos el papel fundamental que cumplen los niveles de gobernanza mas elevados, los que al estar desvinculados de las practicas, realidades y necesidades locales, pueden obstaculizar de manera significativa el alcance de la sustentabilidad en pesquerias artesanales, incluso cuando varias condiciones favorables estan presentes.

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