Antidumping in Asia's Emerging Giants
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Over the past decade, China and India have rapidly increased their use of antidumping laws, the world’s
most dominant form of trade protectionism, against their trading partners. Yet, this behavior has triggered
little concern in the United States and Europe. Why? Two leading theories suggest that the recent spike in
Indian and Chinese antidumping measures is temporary. Moreover, the balance of benefits under existing
international legal rules continues to favor American and European producers. As a result, the United
States and European Union have viewed attempts to reform global antidumping laws as against their
interests.
This Article challenges this conventional wisdom. It argues that India and China’s antidumping regimes
pose a larger long-term threat to the global trade regime than is commonly believed. Through novel
empirical tests of the two leading theories, I demonstrate why China and India’s recent increase in antidumping
protectionism is not temporary and not destined to level off. Instead, as more industries discover
the benefits of antidumping laws and as China takes a more aggressive retaliatory stance against its
trading partners, both countries’ use of antidumping sanctions will likely continue to increase. To guard
against this increased protectionism, this Article argues that World Trade Organization members should
reverse their opposition to reforming global antidumping rules and instead enact proposals that place
greater restrictions on antidumping laws. It highlights why the present moment is an opportune time for
reform, but notes that the window for reform is likely to close as China and India acquire increased
economic strength.
[1] H. Vandenbussche,et al. What Explains the Proliferation of Anti-dumping Laws? , 2007 .
[2] P. Narayanan. Anti-dumping in India—Present State and Future Prospects , 2006, Journal of World Trade.