Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design

Auctions have found widespread use in the last few years as a technique for supporting and automating negotiations on the Internet. For example, eBay now serves as a new selling channel for individuals, and small and big enterprises. Another use for auctions is for industrial procurement. In both these settings traditional auction mechanisms such as the English, Dutch, First (or Second) price Sealed-Bid auctions are now commonplace. These auctions types are useful for settings where there is a single unit of an item being bought/sold. However, since procurement problems are business-to-business they tend to be more complex and have led to the development and application of advanced auction types that allow for negotiations over multiple units of multiple items, and the configuration of the attributes of items. At the heart of auctions is the problem of decentralized resource allocation.

[1]  William Vickrey,et al.  Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[2]  E. H. Clarke Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[3]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[4]  A. Gibbard Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .

[5]  Jerry R. Green,et al.  Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods , 1977 .

[6]  Roger B. Myerson,et al.  Optimal Auction Design , 1981, Math. Oper. Res..

[7]  S. Rassenti,et al.  A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation , 1982 .

[8]  V. Crawford,et al.  Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes , 1982 .

[9]  M. Satterthwaite,et al.  Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading , 1983 .

[10]  Kalyan Chatterjee,et al.  Bargaining under Incomplete Information , 1983, Oper. Res..

[11]  Robert H. Wilson Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions , 1985 .

[12]  P. Schönemann On artificial intelligence , 1985, Behavioral and Brain Sciences.

[13]  D. Gale,et al.  Multi-Item Auctions , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.

[14]  R. McAfee,et al.  Auctions and Bidding , 1986 .

[15]  Steven R. Williams,et al.  Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency , 1989 .

[16]  M. Trick,et al.  The computational difficulty of manipulating an election , 1989 .

[17]  Eitan Zemel,et al.  Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations , 1989 .

[18]  J. Banks,et al.  Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: an experimental approach. , 1989, The Rand journal of economics.

[19]  R. McAfee,et al.  A dominant strategy double auction , 1992 .

[20]  Yeon-Koo Che Design competition through multidimensional auctions , 1993 .

[21]  Linus Schrage,et al.  An Auction Method for Course Registration , 1993 .

[22]  J. Mcmillan Selling Spectrum Rights , 1994 .

[23]  Vijay Krishna,et al.  Efficient Mechanism Design , 1998 .

[24]  F. Branco The Design of Multidimensional Auctions , 1997 .

[25]  Ronald M. Harstad,et al.  Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions , 1998 .

[26]  Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al.  The Optimality of Being Efficient , 1999 .

[27]  Paula J. Brewer Decentralized computation procurement and computational robustness in a smart market , 1999 .

[28]  David C. Parkes,et al.  iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction , 1999, EC '99.

[29]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems , 1999, Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce.

[30]  J. Schummer Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation , 1999 .

[31]  Steven R. Williams A characterization of efficient, bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms , 1999 .

[32]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Taming the Computational Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: Optimal and Approximate Approaches , 1999, IJCAI.

[33]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions , 2000, Int. J. Electron. Commer..

[34]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions , 2000, EC '00.

[35]  Nicholas R. Jennings,et al.  Efficient mechanisms for the supply of services in multi-agent environments , 1998, ICE '98.

[36]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[37]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction , 2000, EC '00.

[38]  Ennio Stacchetti,et al.  The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[39]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[40]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms , 2000, EC '00.

[41]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Solving Combinatorial Auctions Using Stochastic Local Search , 2000, AAAI/IAAI.

[42]  L. Wein,et al.  An Inverse-Optimization-Based Auction Mechanism to Support a Multi-Attribute Rfq Process , 2001 .

[43]  Subhash Suri,et al.  Market Clearability , 2001, IJCAI.

[44]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions , 2001, IJCAI.

[45]  Sven de Vries,et al.  Linear Programming and Vickrey Auctions , 2001 .

[46]  Christos H. Papadimitriou,et al.  Algorithms, games, and the internet , 2001, STOC '01.

[47]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges , 2001, IJCAI.

[48]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Algorithmic Mechanism Design , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[49]  Moshe Babaioff,et al.  Concurrent auctions across the supply chain , 2001, EC '01.

[50]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency , 2001 .

[51]  Amir Ronen,et al.  Mechanism design with incomplete languages , 2001, EC '01.

[52]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Automated Negotiation from Declarative Contract Descriptions , 2001, AGENTS '01.

[53]  Ho Soo Lee,et al.  Computational Aspects of Clearing Continuous Call Double Auctions with Assignment Constraints and Indivisible Demand , 2001, Electron. Commer. Res..

[54]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions , 2001, AAMAS '02.

[55]  David Levine,et al.  CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions , 2001, IJCAI.

[56]  Éva Tardos,et al.  Frugal path mechanisms , 2002, SODA '02.

[57]  Brenda L Dietrich,et al.  Mathematics of the internet : e-auction and markets , 2002 .

[58]  David Levine,et al.  Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations , 2002, AAMAS '02.

[59]  N. Nisan,et al.  The Communication Complexity of Efficient Allocation Problems , 2002 .

[60]  Andrew J. Davenport,et al.  Price Negotiations for Procurement of Direct Inputs , 2002 .

[61]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates , 2002, AAAI/IAAI.

[62]  Y. Shoham,et al.  Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions , 2002, JACM.

[63]  Elizabeth Sklar,et al.  Co-evolutionary Auction Mechanism Design: A Preliminary Report , 2002, AMEC.

[64]  Joseph A. Swanson,et al.  Special Issue: Experimental Economics in Practice: The First Use of a Combined-Value Auction for Transportation Services , 2002, Interfaces.

[65]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Auctions with severely bounded communication , 2002, The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings..

[66]  Joan Feigenbaum,et al.  Distributed algorithmic mechanism design: recent results and future directions , 2002, DIALM '02.

[67]  Tuomas Sandholm,et al.  Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions , 2002, AMEC.

[68]  Dave Cliff,et al.  Evolution of market mechanism through a continuous space of auction-types , 2002, Proceedings of the 2002 Congress on Evolutionary Computation. CEC'02 (Cat. No.02TH8600).

[69]  Sushil Bikhchandani,et al.  The Package Assignment Model , 2002, J. Econ. Theory.

[70]  Madhav V. Marathe,et al.  Proceedings of the 6th international workshop on Discrete algorithms and methods for mobile computing and communications , 2002 .

[71]  Vincent Conitzer,et al.  Complexity of Mechanism Design , 2002, UAI.

[72]  A. Roth The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics , 2002 .

[73]  Ian Dickinson,et al.  An Ontology Based Approach to Automated Negotiation , 2002, AMEC.

[74]  Peter R. Wurman,et al.  Structural leverage and fictitious play in sequential auctions , 2002, AAAI/IAAI.

[75]  David C. Parkes,et al.  An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction , 2002 .

[76]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  Specifying Rules for Electronic Auctions , 2002, AI Mag..

[77]  Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al.  Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding , 2002 .

[78]  Michael P. Wellman,et al.  The 2001 trading agent competition , 2002, Electron. Mark..

[79]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions , 2002, AMEC.

[80]  Tuomas Sandholm eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server , 2002, Comput. Intell..

[81]  Craig Boutilier,et al.  Solving concisely expressed combinatorial auction problems , 2002, AAAI/IAAI.

[82]  Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing , 2003, EC '03.

[83]  W. N Konings,et al.  The encyclopedia of life support systems , 2003 .

[84]  Jérémie Gallien,et al.  Design and analysis of a smart market for industrial procurement , 2003 .

[85]  Anshul Kothar,et al.  Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions , 2003 .

[86]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions , 2003, TARK '03.

[87]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations , 2003, EC '03.

[88]  Martin Bichler,et al.  RECO: Representation and Evaluation of Configurable Offers , 2003 .

[89]  D. Krych CALCULATION AND ANALYSIS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA OF VICKREY-BASED PAYMENT RULES FOR COMBINATORIAL EXCHANGES , 2003 .

[90]  Éva Tardos,et al.  An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents , 2003, SODA '03.

[91]  Sven de Vries,et al.  Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey , 2003, INFORMS J. Comput..

[92]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks , 2003, IPTPS.

[93]  Pinar Keskinocak,et al.  Combinatorial Auctions in Procurement , 2004 .

[94]  Joan Feigenbaum,et al.  Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing , 2003, EC '03.

[95]  Moshe Tennenholtz,et al.  Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions , 2002, Games Econ. Behav..

[96]  Paul Milgrom,et al.  Putting Auction Theory to Work , 2004 .

[97]  Lawrence M. Ausubel An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects , 2004 .

[98]  David C. Parkes,et al.  Auction design with costly preference elicitation , 2005, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence.

[99]  Martin Bichler,et al.  Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions , 2005, Eur. J. Oper. Res..

[100]  Anthony M. Kwasnica,et al.  A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions , 2005, Manag. Sci..

[101]  Soumyadip Ghosh,et al.  Bid Evaluation in Procurement Auctions with Piecewise Linear Supply Curves , 2005, J. Heuristics.